| 政府管制模型研究:基于消费者参与的理论视角 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 徐云鹏,张旭昆. 政府管制模型研究:基于消费者参与的理论视角[J]. 技术经济, 2008, 27(8): 71-74 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 徐云鹏 张旭昆 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 1. 浙江大学,经济学院,杭州,310027
2. 浙江工商大学,杭州,310018 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 委托一代理理论被广泛应用于激励性管制模型研究，但其约束条件并不总能得到满足。本文放宽管制模型的约束条件，并将消费者作为信息传递者引入管制模型，探讨了立法者利用消费者信息来提高社会福利水平的条件以及对消费者的最优转移支付水平。
|
| 关 键 词： | 政府管制 委托一代理理论 激励相容 社会福利 |
Analysis on Government Regulation Model:A Theoretical Perspective of Consumer' s Participation |
| |
| Xu Yunpeng,Zhang Xukun. Analysis on Government Regulation Model:A Theoretical Perspective of Consumer' s Participation[J]. Technology Economics, 2008, 27(8): 71-74 |
| |
| Authors: | Xu Yunpeng Zhang Xukun |
| |
| Affiliation: | Xu Yunpeng1,Zhang Xukun2(1.College of Economics,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou 310027,China,2.Zhejiang Gongshang University,Hangzhou 310018,China) |
| |
| Abstract: | Principal-agent theory has been applied widely the study on incentive regulation model. However,the constraint conditions of this theory can’t be satisfied all the time. This paper looses the constraint conditions of the regulation modle,and introduces the consumer as the signal deliver into the regulation model.And it analyzes the conditions of improving social welfare level through using the consumer’s information and the optimal level of transfer payment to consumer. |
| |
| Keywords: | government regulation principal-agent theory incentive compatibility social welfare |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
| 点击此处可从《技术经济》浏览原始摘要信息 |
|
点击此处可从《技术经济》下载全文 |
|
