基于管理者与股东冲突行为的并购价值悖论分析

2002年Cording提出并购价值悖论,引起了学界对此命题的关注与研究热潮。本文借鉴社会冲突理论,对并购交易过程中管理者与股东之间冲突行为进行理论建模,通过模型分析得出冲突行为如何影响并购价值创造的作用机制。结论如下：在公司并购过程中,管理者可能会选择冲突,也可能选择合作。这主要由并购规模、激励水平、社会保护力量和冲突技术水平等因素决定。一般地,并购规模越大,管理者更倾向选择冲突。此外,激励水平越高、社会保护力量越强和股东的冲突技术水平越高,管理者越倾向选择合作。并购交易中管理者与股东的冲突模型较好地解释了现实中为什么有些并购交易能够创造价值而有些并购交易却损毁公司价值,为解释并购价值悖论现象提供了一个新的视角。

The Economic Analysis of the Paradox of M＆A Value： Based on the Conflict between the Management and the Shareholder

The paradox of MA value proposed by Cording（ 2002） had aroused a great interest in scholars to research this proposition. This paper builds a theory model,with reference to social conflict theory,of conflict behaviors between manager and owner in MA trade process to analyze how conflict behaviors influence the mechanism of value creation,and finds in MA process,managers may choose conflict or cooperation depending on the restiveness among scale of MA,level of incentive,power of social protection and technical level of owner＇s conflict. Generally,the higher the scale of MA is,the more likely the manager inclines to conflict. Besides,the higher the incentive level,the stronger the power of social protection and the higher the technical level of owner＇s conflict are,the more likely the manager inclines to cooperation. This model,on the conflict between manager and owner in MA trade,explains why some MA creates value and why some MA damages value,and provides a new perspective to explain the paradox of MA value.