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公司治理与代理成本——来自上市公司的经验证据
引用本文:高雷,李芬香,张杰. 公司治理与代理成本——来自上市公司的经验证据[J]. 财会通讯, 2007, 0(4)
作者姓名:高雷  李芬香  张杰
作者单位:[1]汕头大学商学院 [2]汕头大学商学院 广东汕头 [3]广东汕头
基金项目:香港特区政府研究资助局项目(CUHK4437/04H)
摘    要:本文利用上市公司的数据,分析了公司治理与代理成本之间的关系。结果发现:股权集中度国家股比例、董事会规模、监事会规模、治理环境、公司透明度、企业规模与代理成本显著负相关;股权制衡度、领取报酬的董事比例、领取报酬的监事比例、董事会会议次数、股东大会会议次数与代理成本显著正相关;高管持股、独立董事比例、监事会会议次数、两职分离与代理成本无显著关系;财务杠杆率与代理成本的关系是混合的;国有上市公司和民营上市公司的公司治理与代理成本之间的关系与总样本基本一致。

关 键 词:代理成本  公司治理  内部治理  外部治理

Corporate Governance and Agency Cost:Evidence from Listed Companies
Gao Lei Li Fenxiang Zhang Jie. Corporate Governance and Agency Cost:Evidence from Listed Companies[J]. Communication of Finance and Accounting, 2007, 0(4)
Authors:Gao Lei Li Fenxiang Zhang Jie
Abstract:Using the data of listed firms,this paper investigates the relationship between corporate governance and agency cost We have three main findings.First,agency cost is significantly and positively associated with the concentration of stock ownership,the share of state-held stocks,the size of board of directors and board of supervisors,corporate governance environment,corporate transparency,and firm size.Second,agency cost is significantly and positively associated with the balances of stock ownership,the ratio of paid board directors and supervisors,and the frequency of the board meetings and stockholder conferences.Third,agency cost has no significant relationship with the stocks held by senior manager as incentive,the ratio of independent directors,the frequency of the meetings of supervisors,and the separation of owners from managers.Forth,the relationship between leverage and agency cost is mixed.Finally,the relationships between corporate governance and agency cost of state-owned listed firms and private listed firms are not different from that of the whole sample.
Keywords:Agency cost Corporate governance Internal governance External governance
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