| Abstract: | This paper studies the interactions of fiscal policy and monetarypolicy when they stabilize a single economy against shocks ina dynamic setting. If both policy-makers are benevolent, then,in our model, the best outcome is achieved when monetary policydoes nearly all of the stabilization. If the monetary authoritiesare benevolent, but the fiscal authority discounts the future,or aims for an excessive level of output, then a Nash equilibriumwill result in large welfare losses: after an inflation shockthere will be excessively tight monetary policy, excessive fiscalexpansion, and a rapid accumulation of public debt. However,if, in these circumstances, there is a regime of fiscal leadership,then the outcome will be very nearly as good as when both policy-makersare benevolent.
Footnotes
1 E-mail addresses: t.kirsanova{at}exeter.ac.uk; jari.stehn{at}bnc.ox.ac.uk;david.vines{at}economics.oxford.ac.uk |
