母子公司间高管纵向兼任与上市公司资本配置效率

已有研究主要基于母公司或控股股东等委托方利益视角，形成了对纵向高管兼任治理效应的认识。但这种假定忽视了兼任高管作为独立利益主体的利益诉求与私利动机对治理效应的影响。本文基于兼任高管所代表不同利益主体的视角，分析并检验母子公司间高管纵向兼任对上市公司资本配置效率的影响。研究表明，当母子公司间兼任高管代表母公司利益时，母子公司间高管兼任会通过降低子公司代理成本发挥监督效应，进而提升上市公司的资本配置效率；但是当兼任高管代表子公司利益时，母子公司间高管兼任并未发挥治理效应，甚至存在母子公司间高管兼任的上市公司中，代表子公司利益的高管兼任会将争取超额资金异化为寻租渠道，进而降低上市公司资本配置效率。本文将扩展对高管纵向兼任治理效应的理论解释，丰富上市公司资本配置效率决定机理的研究，对完善母子公司结构下的治理机制具有一定的启示意义。

Vertical Interlocks of Executives Between Headquarters and Subsidiaries and Capital Allocation Efficiency of Listed Companies

Existing studies imply the assumption of the governance effect of vertical interlocks of executives based on the upper-level (headquarters or shareholders) interests, ignoring the impact of interests of these executives as independent stakeholders and their self-interest motives on governance effects. From the perspective of different interests, this paper analyzes and examines the impact of vertical interlocks of executives between headquarters and subsidiaries on the capital allocation efficiency of listed companies. It is found that when representing interests of the headquarter, these executives will exert a supervisory effect by reducing agency costs of subsidiaries, thereby improving the capital allocation efficiency of listed companies. However, when representing interests of subsidiaries, the executives fail to exert governance effects, and even in listed companies with interlocks of executives between headquarters and subsidiaries, the executives representing the interest of subsidiaries will be dissimilated into rent-seeking channels, thereby reducing the capital allocation efficiency. This paper may expand the theoretical explanation of the governance effect of vertical interlocks of executives, enrich the research on the decision-making of capital allocation efficiency of listed companies, and provide enlightenment for improving the governance mechanism under the structure of headquarters and subsidiaries.