Large extensive form games |
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Authors: | Carlos Alós-Ferrer Klaus Ritzberger |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Box 150, 78457, Konstanz, Germany 2. Department of Economics and Finance, Vienna Graduate School of Finance and Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Stumpergasse 56, 1060, Vienna, Austria
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Abstract: | This paper provides a self-contained definition and a characterization of the class of extensive form games that are adequate for applications, but still do not employ any finiteness assumptions. In spite of its simplicity, the resulting definition is more general than the classical ones. Moreover, we show that this class satisfies the basic desiderata that strategies induce outcomes and do so uniquely. Within the class of playable extensive forms, the characterization is by the existence of an immediate predecessor function on the set of moves. |
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