A model of periodic job training

This paper examines conditions under which a demand-constrained, cost-minimizing firm will provide industry-specific on-the-job-training to its employees, when a flexible stock of outside labor is available for hire. The term industry-specific is used to describe training with general components valued by other firms in the industry. This definition of on-the-job-training offers the possibility that trained workers could be poached by competing firms and provides limited opportunities for newly trained workers to seek alternative employment. The firm's decisions involve whether or not to invest in on-the-job-training, and whether to use in-house labor exclusively or a mix of in-house and outside labor. The cost-minimizing strategy is crucially dependent upon the mutual loyalty of the firm and its workers.This paper has benefited from numerous comments from the participants of the 41st International Atlantic Economic Conference in Paris, March 12–19, 1996.