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Not all call auctions are created equal: evidence from Hong Kong
Authors:Carole Comerton-Forde  James Rydge  Hayley Burridge
Institution:(1) Discipline of Finance, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, 2006, Australia
Abstract:On 25 March 2002, the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd (HKEx) introduced an opening call auction. This trading mechanism is designed to facilitate price discovery in the presence of asymmetric information at the market open, increasing opening price efficiency. The design of the HKEx differs significantly from opening auctions in other markets. Contrary to previous research, the results indicate a decrease in market quality following the introduction of the opening call auction. This decline is largest in the less actively traded stocks.
Contact Information Carole Comerton-FordeEmail:
Keywords:Call auction  Auction design  Price efficiency
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