INCENTIVE ISSUES IN R&D CONSORTIA: INSIGHTS FROM APPLIED GAME THEORY |
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| Authors: | ERAN BINENBAUM |
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| Institution: | 1. Binenbaum: School of Economics, University of Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia. Phone +61‐8‐84311405, Fax +61‐8‐82231460, E‐mail eran.binenbaum@adelaide.edu.au;2. Thanks are due to John Mathews, Phil Pardey, Ahmad Rahman, and Perry Shapiro;3. to attendants of 2005 conference sessions of the WEAI, AAEA, and ASE;4. to two anonymous referees;5. and to seminar participants at the University of Sydney, School of Economics and Political Science, for helpful comments. Additionally, I am grateful to Pardey for helping to produce Figure?1 and to Luis Sanint (formerly of FLAR) for some very useful ideas and expert insider insights. The usual disclaimer applies. |
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| Abstract: | This article sketches how insights from applied game theory can be applied to Research and Development (R&D) consortia using a case study on an international plant breeding consortium. The insights jointly comprise a new “logic of collective action in R&D,” which is inspired by Olson’s Logic of Collective Action but goes beyond it. We analyze R&D consortia as institutions that respond to a variety of incentive problems which are obstacles to realizing the benefits of cooperation that arise due to the public goods nature of outputs, complementarities of inputs, and economies of scale and scope. Additionally, we sketch a “big‐picture” consortium game, which abstracts from specific incentive issues. (JEL B41, D02, H41, O31, O32) |
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