THE VALUE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION IN MONOPOLY* |
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| Authors: | ALEXANDER E. SAAK |
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| Affiliation: | Department of Agricultural Economics, Kansas State University, 331D Waters Hall, Manhattan, Kansas 66506‐4011, U.S.A.
e‐mail:alexsaak@agecon.ksu.edu |
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| Abstract: | We investigate a basic question about a monopoly with incomplete information: when does the seller have an incentive to allow potential buyers to acquire more private information about their tastes for the seller's product? Under plausible conditions such as log‐concave density of willingness‐to‐pay and convex marginal cost, the seller prefers that the paying customers be well informed as a group but be left in the dark regarding their individual tastes. |
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