大股东侵占、公司声誉与公司绩效——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

外部大股东一方面具有减少管理者机会主义行为的积极效果,另一方面又会利用控制权侵占小股东和其他利益相关者的利益影响公司绩效;约束大股东行为、保护中小投资者利益成为公司治理的核心问题。在诸多约束大股东侵占的机制中,公司声誉机制被认为是约束大股东利益侵占的有效机制。本文采用2004年1261家上市公司为研究对象,对大股东侵占度和公司声誉制约机制对上市公司绩效的影响进行了实证分析,结果表明,大股东侵占度对公司绩效的影响不显著,公司声誉对公司绩效产生了显著的正面效应。此外,我们还发现法律环境对公司绩效产生积极影响。

Large Shareholder Expropriation, Corporate Reputation,and Corporate Performance——Evidence from China''''s Listed Companies

Large outside stockholders have a positive effect to reduce the management opportunist behavior. But on the other hand they can also make use of their controlling right to invade the interests of minority shareholders and other stakeholders and affect the corporate performance. The core question in the corporate governance is to protect the minority shareholder's interests by restraining the large stockholders behavior. Among all the regulating mechanisms, corporate reputation is a effective mechanism to avoid the large shareholders expropriation. This article has made an empirical research on the influence of restraint mechanisms between the large shareholder expropriation and corporate reputation from the performance data of 1261listed companies in 2004. Empirical results show that large shareholder expropriation doesn't influence the corporate performance significantly, but the corporate reputation has significantly positive effect on the corporate performance. In addition, we also discover that the legal environment has the positive influence on the corporate performance.