Federalism and Conflicts over Principalship. Some Insights into the American Constitutional History |
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| Authors: | Jean-Michael Josselin Alain Marciano |
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| Institution: | (1) Université de Rennes 1 and Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CREM), France;;(2) Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (GREQAM), and Institut d'Économie Publique, Université de Reims Champagne Ardenne (OMI-EDJ), France, Faculté de Reims-Champagne Ardenne 57 bis, rue Pierre Taitinger, 51096 Reims Cedex |
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| Abstract: | The article provides an economic interpretation of Kelsen's theory of decentralized governments. It helps to distinguish different forms of federalism and in particular the corresponding conflicts of principalship inside the governmental structure. The model is applied to the early American constitutional history and shows how opposed views of agency relationships in the constitution foreshadowed what would later end up in a civil war. |
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| Keywords: | federalism American constitutional history agency theory strategic behavior |
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