大股东占款与上市公司盈利能力关系研究

大股东占款是我国上市公司治理亟待解决的问题之一。本文以1998—2003年的非金融类上市公司为样本,以大股东占款为研究对象,检验了上市公司盈利能力对大股东占款行为的影响。研究发现,上市公司上年盈利能力水平不同,大股东的占款行为不同。当以上市公司的主营业务利润为基础的总资产利润率(CROA)小于-3.14%时,大股东占款与上市公司盈利能力正相关,表现出大股东的资金掏空行为;当上市公司的CROA介于-3.14%~42.76%区间内时,大股东占款与上市公司盈利能力负相关,表现出大股东的资金支持行为;当上市公司的CROA高于42.76%时,大股东占款随着上市公司盈利能力的提高而增加,表现出大股东的资金掏空行为。

Firm Profitability and Embezzlement Behavior of Controlling Shareholder

This Paper studies the impact of firm profitability of listed company on embezzlement behavior of its controlling shareholder.The results show that for different level of firm profitability,controlling shareholder behaves differently in terms of tunneling and propping.When the ratio of operating profit to total assets is lower than-3.14%,there is positive relationship between the extent of embezzlement by controlling shareholder and firm profitability.When the ratio is between-3.14% and 42.76%,the embezzlement tends to decrease as the firm performs better.When the measure of business performance is above 42.76%,the embezzlement tends to increase as the firm performs better.