Negotiation versus consultation in the development of a regulation |
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Authors: | Paul Calcott |
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Affiliation: | (1) School of Economics and Finance, Victoria University of Wellington, P.O. Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand |
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Abstract: | Under negotiated regulation, stakeholders are invited to reach an agreement on a regulatory innovation. This approach might be harmful, because potential improvements might be blocked. However, negotiation can also be beneficial—eliciting information about how to improve regulations. Three reasons are identified. First, a participant might hesitate to provide information, unless she can prevent that information being used against her interests. Second, negotiation provides stronger incentives than consultation does, to suggest innovations that primarily benefit parties other than oneself. Third, if uninformed stakeholders can reduce the no-information payoff of informed parties, those parties lose the incentive to strategically withhold information. |
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Keywords: | Negotiated Regulation Externality Consensus |
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