Tit for tat: Foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings |
| |
Authors: | Uzi Segal |
| |
Affiliation: | a Department of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, USA b Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA |
| |
Abstract: | This paper assumes that in addition to conventional preferences over outcomes, players in a strategic environment have preferences over strategies. It provides conditions under which a player's preferences over strategies can be represented as a weighted average of the utility from outcomes of the individual and his opponents. The weight one player places on an opponent's utility from outcomes depends on the players’ joint behavior. In this way, the framework is rich enough to describe the behavior of individuals who repay kindness with kindness and meanness with meanness. The paper identifies restrictions that the theory places on rational behavior. |
| |
Keywords: | C72 D63 |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|