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Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions
Authors:Andrea Attar,Gwenaë  l Piaser,Nicolá  s Porteiro
Affiliation:a IDEI, Université de Toulouse I, France
b Università di Roma, La Sapienza, Italy
c Università Ca’ Foscari di Venezia, Italy
d Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Spain
Abstract:In a recent paper, Peters [Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency, J. Econ. Theory 111 (2003) 189-228] identifies a set of restrictions on players’ preferences, called “no-externalities assumption”, under which, in common agency games, there is no loss of generality in restricting principals’ strategies to be take-it or leave-it offers. The present note provides an example to show that these conditions are not sufficient when the agent takes a non-contractible action.
Keywords:D82
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