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Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions |
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| Authors: | Andrea Attar Gwenaël Piaser Nicolás Porteiro |
| Institution: | a IDEI, Université de Toulouse I, France b Università di Roma, La Sapienza, Italy c Università Ca’ Foscari di Venezia, Italy d Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Spain |
| Abstract: | In a recent paper, Peters Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency, J. Econ. Theory 111 (2003) 189-228] identifies a set of restrictions on players’ preferences, called “no-externalities assumption”, under which, in common agency games, there is no loss of generality in restricting principals’ strategies to be take-it or leave-it offers. The present note provides an example to show that these conditions are not sufficient when the agent takes a non-contractible action. |
| Keywords: | D82 |
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