Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets |
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Authors: | Lars Ehlers Jordi Massó |
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Institution: | a Département de Sciences Économiques and CIREQ, Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128 Succursale Centre Ville, Montréal, Québec Canada H3C 3J7 b Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica and CODE, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain |
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Abstract: | We study ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truth-telling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores. Our result matches the observations of Roth and Peranson The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: some engineering aspects of economic design, Amer. Econ. Rev. 89 (1999) 748-780] in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) in the United States: (i) the cores of the profiles submitted to the clearinghouse are small and (ii) while truth-telling is not a dominant strategy most participants in the NRMP truthfully reveal their preferences. |
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Keywords: | C78 D81 J44 |
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