首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     


Evolution in Bayesian games II: Stability of purified equilibria
Authors:William H. Sandholm
Affiliation:Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison, WI 53706, USA
Abstract:We study the evolutionary stability of purified equilibria of two-player normal form games, providing simple sufficient conditions for stability and for instability under the Bayesian best response dynamic.
Keywords:C72   C73
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号