Erratum to “Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency”: [Journal of Economic Theory 111 (2003) 88-109] |
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Authors: | Michael Peters |
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Institution: | Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, 997-1873 East Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z1 |
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Abstract: | The no-externalities condition provided in the text is not sufficient for Theorems 3 and 4 when effort is not fully contractable. In the case where the principals cannot contract at all on agent's effort, the condition in the text requires that for any set of alternatives offered by the principal there is one that is at least as good as all other alternatives in the set for the agent no matter what the other principal does, no matter what effort the agent takes, and no matter what the agent's type. In fact, a stronger condition is required. For any set of alternatives offered by a principal, each of the choices within this set that is at least as good for the agent as any other choice within the set must remain so no matter what actions the other principals take, no matter what effort the agent takes, and no matter what the agent's type. |
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Keywords: | D82 |
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