Sequentially consistent rules of choice under complete uncertainty |
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Authors: | Ricardo Arlegi |
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Institution: | Department of Economics, Public University of Navarre, Campus, Arrosadia s/n, 31006 Pamplona-Iruñea, Spain |
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Abstract: | This work analyzes the problem of individual choice under complete uncertainty. In this context, each alternative action consists of a set of different possible outcomes with no associated probability distribution. The work examines and defines a class of rules such that: (a) the evaluation of sets (actions) follows a certain procedural pattern; and (b) an assumption of sequential contraction consistency, which is an adaptation of Sen's α condition, is satisfied. In this framework, some results of characterization show that several well-known rules for comparing sets of outcomes can be reinterpreted in procedural terms. |
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Keywords: | D81 |
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