Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods |
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Authors: | Szilvia Pápai |
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Institution: | Department of Economics, Concordia University, 1455 De Maisonneuve Blvd. West, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3G 1M8 |
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Abstract: | We show how to restrict trades in exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods so that the resulting restricted exchange markets, the fixed deal exchange markets, have a unique core allocation. Our results on fixed deal exchange markets generalize classical results on the Shapley-Scarf housing market, in which each agent owns one good only. Furthermore, we define the class of fixed deal exchange rules for general exchange markets, and prove that these are the only exchange rules that satisfy strategyproofness, individual rationality, and a weak form of efficiency. |
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Keywords: | D78 C78 C71 |
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