Core tâtonnement |
| |
Authors: | Mihai Manea |
| |
Institution: | Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA |
| |
Abstract: | Two discrete time tâtonnement processes—one featuring successive tâtonnement, the other featuring simultaneous tâtonnement—for the core of coalitional games with transferable utility are introduced. For totally balanced games, the successive core tâtonnement process corresponds to the standard simultaneous price tâtonnement process of competitive equilibrium theory via the Shapley-Shubik (market game-direct market) correspondence. The simultaneous core tâtonnement process is based entirely on the intuition behind the definition of the core for games with transferable utility, and it does not correspond to any evident competitive equilibrium tâtonnement process. Both processes are proven to be globally stable. The two processes offer easily implementable algorithms for approximately computing core points. |
| |
Keywords: | C61 C63 C71 |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|