对赌协议、利益不一致与企业创新投入

应用跳跃变化下的几何布朗运动模型,从VC投资者与企业家间利益差异角度探讨企业签订对赌协议对创新支出影响的作用机制。结合新三板创新型公司数据,手动搜集2010-2018年VC参与的新三板公司融资事件,运用PSM匹配方法进行实证检验。结果表明,签订对赌协议抑制企业创新支出,且对赌期间业绩目标更高、VC占股较高时对创新投入的负向影响更明显。企业在对赌期间面临着巨大的业绩压力,签订对赌协议加大了VC与投资者间利益不一致,减少创新支出能够缩小二者间不一致区间。断资比例低对于对赌抑制创新起到缓解作用,即断资点越低,对赌抑制创新的作用越弱。

Valuation Adjustment Mechanism,Inconsistent Interest and Innovation Expenditure

By applying the geometric Brownian with the jump-diffusion model,the mechanism of the effect of the VAM(Valuation Adjustment Mechanism) on the innovation expenditure is explored from the angle of the difference between the VC investor and the entrepreneur.In combination with the data of the new OTC market,financing events of VC's participation in the period 2010-2018 are collected manually.The method of PSM matching is used to carry out the empirical test.The result shows that VAM can restrain the innovation expenditure of the enterprise,and the negative effect on the innovation investment is more obvious when the target of the VAM is higher and the proportion of the VC is higher.The enterprise is faced with great performance pressure,the signing of VAM aggravates the inconsistency of the interests between the VC and the investor,and the reduce of innovation expenditure can relief the interval inconsistency between them.The proportion of capital cut-off point plays a key role in the effect of VAM and innovation,that is,the lower the cut-off point,the less the effect of the suppression.