首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

产业政策与信贷资金配置效率
引用本文:李广子,刘力.产业政策与信贷资金配置效率[J].金融研究,2020,479(5):114-131.
作者姓名:李广子  刘力
作者单位:中国社会科学院金融研究所/国家金融与发展实验室,北京 100028;北京大学光华管理学院,北京 100871
基金项目:* 本文得到国家社会科学基金项目(基金编号18BJY250)和国家留学基金委的资助。
摘    要:基于上市公司逐笔银行贷款合约数据,本文考察了产业政策对信贷资金配置效率的影响.研究发现,当上市公司处于国家产业政策支持的行业时,公司所拥有的政企关系对银行贷款合约制定的积极作用会更大,全要素生产率对银行贷款合约制定的积极作用会更小,基于分省产业政策以及上市公司全部贷款数据的分析进一步确认了上述结论.从影响因素来看,当上市公司为国有企业、所在省份固定资产投资增速越高、法治环境越差时,产业政策的影响会越明显.本文的证据表明,通过加强法治建设、为不同所有制企业提供公平的竞争环境、改善产业政策的制定与实施,能够提升产业政策指导下的信贷资金配置效率.

关 键 词:产业政策  贷款合约  政企关系  全要素生产率  效率

Industrial Policy and Credit Allocation Efficiency
LI Guangzi,LIU Li.Industrial Policy and Credit Allocation Efficiency[J].Journal of Financial Research,2020,479(5):114-131.
Authors:LI Guangzi  LIU Li
Institution:Institute of Finance/Banking and National Institution for Finance & Development, CASS; Guanghua School of Management, Peking University
Abstract:Industrial policies are government policies that promote a certain industry in a country or region and represent government intervention in the economy. Although such policies are widely used, there is no consensus on their economic consequences. On the one hand, industrial policies help to overcome market failure; on the other, the government lacks sufficient information to pick winners, and industrial policies may lead to rent-seeking behavior. The question of how to evaluate the effects of industrial policies on the efficiency of economic resource allocation has attracted widespread theoretical and practical attention.
China's financial system is dominated by indirect finance, and efficient credit allocation is the key to its overall operating efficiency. In practice, there is a close relationship between bank loans and industrial policy: credit policy itself is a part of industrial policy in some circumstances, and other industrial policies often work by encouraging or restricting bank loans. The efficiency of loan contracting reflects the efficiency of credit allocation. For this reason, loan contracting provides a proper perspective for understanding the relationship between industrial policy and the efficiency of economic resource allocation.
We analyze the effect of industrial policy on credit allocation efficiency from the perspective of loan contracting. Loan contract data is manually collected from the notes to the annual reports of listed firms from 2008 to 2015; the data set consists of 13,096 loan contracts from 1,069 listed firms. An industry is defined as supported by industry policy if it belongs to the industries supported by the national Five Year Plan. The major findings are as follows. (1) For listed firms that are in industries supported by national industrial policy, the favorable effect of firm's relationship with the government on loan contracting is greater, and the favorable effect of TFP on loan contracting is smaller. (2) The effect of industrial policy on loan contracting is stronger for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and for firms located in provinces with higher growth rates for fixed asset investments and weaker legal environments.
Our research contributes to the literature in the following three ways. First, it is the first to investigate the effect of industrial policy on the efficiency of economic resource allocation from the perspective of loan contracting in China. Previous studies have analyzed how industrial policy affects firms' investment and financing behavior, output, innovation, employment, etc. This paper examines how industrial policy affects the relation between firm's relationship with the government and loan contracting. This study also directly examines the effect of industrial policy on credit allocation efficiency, which provides a new perspective for understanding the mechanism through which industrial policy functions. Second, this study provides direct evidence that industrial policy may lead to rent-seeking behavior. Rodrik (2004, 2008) argues that industrial policy often fails due to rent-seeking behavior. Specifically, industrial policy causes economic resources to flow to firms related with the government. We find that industrial policy increases the favorable effect of firms' relationship with the government on loan contracting, which provides direct support for the notion that rent-seeking behavior may result from industrial policy. Third, this paper analyzes credit allocation efficiency from the perspective of loan contracting, which enriches the literature on credit allocation efficiency in China.
Our findings have a number of policy implications. First, the government should take a more prudent attitude toward industrial policy. For industrial policies that are considered necessary, the government should ensure more effective decision-making from the beginning. Second, the government should more closely supervise the implementation of industrial policy to prevent market players from using it for rent-seeking and to reduce the distortion of resource allocation. Third, financial institutions should engage in greater credit management in relation to industrial policy, prevent the abuse of funds, and improve credit allocation efficiency. Fourth, industrial policy should focus on creating a good market environment that supports favored industries.
Keywords:Industrial Policy  Loan Contract  Relationship between Firm and Government  TFP  Efficiency  
本文献已被 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《金融研究》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《金融研究》下载免费的PDF全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号