需求和供给冲击对企业投资以及价值链的影响——基于突发事件的研究

2019年底爆发的COVID-19疫情给全球经济的需求和供给带来了冲击,本文分析了历史上若干需求和供给冲击对企业投资和全球价值链的影响,在此基础上探讨此次疫情事件的潜在影响以及应对措施。需求冲击方面,我们发现2008年的国际金融危机对中国上市企业的固定资产投资有明显的抑制作用,但这种负面影响随着国内宏观调控政策的见效而很快减小;危机对全球价值链的分布有显著影响,欧盟地区的制造业增加值占全球比重下降,中国和东盟的占比上升。供给冲击方面,2003年的SARS疫情在短期内抑制了疫区上市企业的固定资产投资,但我国迅速有效的防疫措施很快扭转了投资下降势头。相比之下,2011年日本地震的冲击逆转了此前该国制造业增加值长期上升的势头,在中短期内显著降低了日本在全球价值链中的重要性。从针对此次疫情的应对措施来看,建议采取提振内需的宏观政策,在行业层面稳定产业链上的核心企业,同时整合优化产能。在国际上我国应坚持对外开放,立足和周边国家以及“一带一路”沿线国家的合作,促进疫情后国际经济治理秩序的改革和优化。

The Effects of Demand and Supply Shocks on Firm Investment and the Global Value Chain: A Study based on Unexpected Events

The Covid-19 pandemic of 2019 is significantly affecting the development of the Chinese economy. Against this background, we study how various historical events that led to supply and demand shocks affected firm investment and the global value chain.
We find that the demand shock associated with the 2008 economic crisis had a significant but short-lived impact on the investment of firms listed in China, with the effects mainly limited to the first half of 2008. Investment reverted to normal after the Chinese government rolled out stimulus policies, but in 2009 the crisis significantly dampened trade and the global value chain (GVC). Although the level of GVC participation recovered quickly in most countries, different trends in the weight in global output were evidentin three core regions of manufacturing GVC. The shares of key countries in the European Union and North America declined after 2008, and in ASEAN+3 countries (ASEAN plus China, Japan, and Korea) the shares rose significantly, with much of the rise attributed to domestic stimulus in China.
We investigate supply shocks by first comparing the investment behavior of listed firms from Beijing and Guangdong, two regions at the center of the SARS outbreak in 2003, to those in other provinces at and after the outbreak. We observe weaker investment by firms in Beijing and Guangdong but no difference was evident after three quarters, presumably because of the effective control of the SARS epidemic. We also find the 2011 Japanese earthquake significantly affected Japan's position in the manufacturing GVC. In particular, the manufacturing value added lost its positive long-term trend. In the short-term, Japan's clout in the GVC was also diminished.
The above findings provide insights about how China should react to the Covid-19 pandemic. First, when faced with external shocks, policies aimed at shoring up domestic demand not only stabilize firm investment but also strengthen China's position in the GVC and hence form the basis for further growth in the manufacturing sector. Second, long-lasting supply shocks, such as the 2011 Japanese earthquake, can significantly impact a country's manufacturing output, and hence require serious responses. While China achieved control over the Covid-19 pandemic and promptly restarted the economy, the multiple risks associated with the worldwide impact of the pandemic should be recognized. In addition to affecting the supply chain of China, the continued spread of Covid-19 will increase tension in international economic relations and may even lead to a significant reversal of globalization. China should continue to open its economy to the world, but it also needs to consider its potential responses to substantial change in the international economic landscape.
In light of the current economic situation, our findings lead to various implications about economic policies.First, the policy responses to the 2003 SARS epidemic and the 2008 economic crisis demonstrate that a sound domestic economy is the key to economic stability. Thus, fiscal and monetary policies should be used to effectively boost domestic demand. While maintaining control over the pandemic, local governments should be encouraged to tailor and differentiate their policies to restart the economy, revive daily life, and restore normal societal order.Second, the threat to the GVC and the supply chain posed by the pandemic in other economies indicates that China should adjust, consolidate, and optimize its industrial capacity. To address risks in the upstream supply, domestic firms should be encouraged to source from domestic suppliers, building up the resilience of the supply chain. In an uncertain international economic environment, some firms may delay moving their capacity overseas. Local governments should help these firms to stabilize their output, thus minimizing their operation risk and supporting employment. In addition to stabilizing key firms along the supply chain, China should consolidate its industrial capacity and speed up the transformation of technologically backward capacity. During the process of economic stabilization, China should not protect firms that would have been forced out by market competition. Third, China should uphold the principle of opening up and international economic cooperation when faced with an uncertain international economic and political environment. Given that the GVC may become more concentrated in specific regions, China may consider strengthening its cooperation with neighboring countries and those engaged in the Belt-and-Road initiative in terms of the GVC and supply chains. By avoiding protectionism and achieving mutual economic development, countries can significantly contribute to the reform and improvement of governance mechanisms in the international economic community post Covid-19.