When parties are not teams: party positions in single-member district and proportional representation systems |
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Authors: | Stephen?Ansolabehere William?Leblanc JrEmail author" target="_blank">James?M?SnyderJrEmail author |
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Institution: | 1.Department of Government,Harvard University,Cambridge,USA;2.Department of Political Science,Massachusetts Institute of Technology,Needham,USA |
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Abstract: | Theoretical analyses of party positions commonly assume that parties act as teams to maximize their legislative representation.
This assumption runs counter to another line of theorizing in which individual legislators maximize their own chances of winning
reelection. To resolve this tension, the paper presents a model of party platform choice that relaxes only the assumption
that parties are teams in the classical two-party spatial model. Platforms are chosen by majority rule among all legislators
within a party. Politicians seek to win their own seats in the legislature, but they must run under a common party label.
In both single-member district and proportional representation systems, equilibrium platforms are shown to diverge substantially,
with one party located near the 25th percentile of the voter distribution and the other near the 75th percentile, rather than
converge to the median. The model also yields predictions concerning short-term economic shocks, incumbency advantages, and
gerrymandering. |
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Keywords: | |
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