Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework |
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Authors: | Guillaume?R?Fréchette Email author" target="_blank">John?H?KagelEmail author Massimo?Morelli |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA;(2) Division of Trade and Investment Policy, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, Seoul, Korea;(3) Department of Economics and Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel |
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Abstract: | We experimentally investigate a legislative bargaining model with both public and particularistic goods. Consistent with the
qualitative implications of the model: there is near exclusive public good provision in the pure public good region, in the
pure private good region minimum winning coalitions sharing private goods predominate, and in the “mixed” region proposers
generally take some particularistic goods for themselves, allocating the remainder to public goods. As in past experiments,
proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted, resulting in public good provision decreasing in the mixed region as
its relative value increases, which is inconsistent with the theory. |
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