The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections |
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Authors: | Matias?Iaryczower Email author" target="_blank">Andrea?MattozziEmail author |
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Institution: | 1.Department of Politics,Princeton University,Princeton,USA;2.MOVE and Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona,Barcelona,Spain |
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Abstract: | We study a model of elections in non-majoritarian systems that captures the link between competition in policies and competition
in campaign spending. We argue that the overall competitiveness of the political arena depends on both the endogenous number
of parties contesting the election and the endogenous level of campaign spending. These two dimensions are linked together
through their combined effect on the total equilibrium level of political rents. We illustrate the key insights of the model
with an analysis of the competitive effects of campaign spending limits. We show that under some conditions spending caps
can be pro-competitive, leading to an increase in the number of parties contesting the elections. |
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Keywords: | |
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