Fending off one means fending off all: evolutionary stability in quasi-submodular aggregative games |
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Authors: | Wolfgang Leininger |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Dortmund, 44221 Dortmund, Germany |
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Abstract: | The implications of evolutionarily stable behavior in finite populations have recently been explored for a variety of aggregative games. This note proves an intimate relationship between quasi-submodularity and global evolutionary stability of strategies for these games, which – apart from being of independent interest – accounts for a number of results obtained in the recent literature: we show that any evolutionarily stable strategy of a quasi-submodular aggregative game must also be globally stable. That is, if one mutant cannot successfully invade a population, any number of mutants can do so even lessThe author is grateful to Ana Ania and Carlos Alōs-Ferrer for comments on an earlier version |
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Keywords: | Quasi-submodular aggregative games ESS Global stability |
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