Group lending and the role of the group leader |
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Authors: | Remco van Eijkel Niels Hermes Robert Lensink |
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Institution: | (1) University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands;; |
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Abstract: | This paper investigates strategic monitoring behavior within group lending. We show that monitoring efforts of group members
differ in equilibrium due to the asymmetry between members in terms of future profits. In particular, we show that the entrepreneur
with the highest future profits also puts in the highest monitoring effort. Moreover, monitoring efforts differ between group
members due to free-riding: one member reduces her level of monitoring if the other increases her monitoring effort. This
effect is also at play when we introduce a group leader into the model. The individual who becomes the group leader supplies
more monitoring effort than in the benchmark case. We empirically test the model using data from a survey of microfinance
in Eritrea and show that the group leader attaches more weight to future periods than nonleaders in the group, which may explain
why a large part of total monitoring is done by the leader. |
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Keywords: | |
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