首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      


Optimal agenda-setter timing
Authors:Mattias K Polborn  Gerald Willmann
Institution:Department of Economics, University of Illinois;
Department of Economics, KU Leuven
Abstract:Abstract .  We analyze the optimal timing problem of an agenda setter who can propose a project that is then voted on by a committee. The payoff consists of a common stochastic component and an idiosyncratic component that differs among committee members. The agenda setter may be biased for or against the project, relative to the median committee member, and chooses when to call the vote. We analyze how the timing decision depends on the political environment and the bias of the agenda setter. We show that both positively and negatively biased agenda setters can implement decisions that differ from those preferred by the median committee member.
Keywords:C7  D7
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号