基于双边市场理论的物流信息平台定价策略研究

面向车货匹配的物流信息平台具有典型的双边市场特征，而价格是物流信息平台与其双边用户货主和车主利益博弈的主要工具。本文运用双边市场理论分析了物流信息平台的定价问题。文章分别从垄断平台双边定价和单边定价的角度给出了物流信息平台最优定价决策，并进行了对比分析和敏感性分析，最后扩展到竞争平台的定价决策。通过建模分析发现，物流信息平台对货主的定价与货主的网络效应强度有关，当货主的网络效应强度大于车主的网络效应时对货主收费，否则对货主免费或补贴；物流信息平台对于车主的定价与车主的增值服务效益成负相关关系，当车主为平台带来的增值服务收益大于某临界值时对车主免费甚至补贴；物流信息平台单边收费时的总利润低于双边收费时的平台总利润。最后结合我国车货匹配市场，以某物流信息平台为对象进行了案例分析。

Study of Pricing Strategies for Logistics Information Platform Based on the Theory of Two-sided Markets

The two-sided market is the typical character of the Logistics Information Platform which focuses on the matching of shippers and drivers. However, the price is a major benefit game instrument of the Logistics Information Platform between its bilateral users of shippers and drivers. This article analyzes the pricing strategies of the Logistics Information Platform by using the theory of the two-sided markets, analyzes the pricing strategies of the platform from the perspective of bilateral pricing and unilateral pricing of the monopoly platform, then comparison and sensitivity analysis are performed, and expand to the scenario of competitive platforms. It is found by analysis that the price of the shipper is relative to network externality, which will be positive when shippers’ network externality is higher than drivers’ and negative when less than drivers’. The price of drivers is relative to the value-added service revenue, which will be positive when the value-added service revenue is less than a threshold and negative when more than the threshold. The platform’s profit of unilateral pricing is less than the bilateral pricing. Finally, this article conducts a case analysis for one logistics information platform in China.