Offshoring and Reshoring: The Roles of Incomplete Contracts and Relative Bargaining Power |
| |
Authors: | Ngo Van Long Maxwell Tuuli |
| |
Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, H3A 2T7, Canada2. Peter B. Gustavson School of Business, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC V8P 5C2, Canada |
| |
Abstract: | This paper demonstrates that an increase in bargaining power of Northern firms relative to that of their Southern contractors can trigger reshoring if the North-South wage differential is moderate, such that only industries with a high share of unskilled labor find outsourcing profitable. However, such an increase in Northern bargaining power can increase offshoring if the wage differential is so high that even industries with a low share of unskilled labor also offshore. |
| |
Keywords: | incomplete contracts bargaining power offshoring reshoring |
|
| 点击此处可从《Frontiers of Economics in China》浏览原始摘要信息 |
|
点击此处可从《Frontiers of Economics in China》下载全文 |