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中央银行货币政策独立性及其法律制度研究
引用本文:伏军. 中央银行货币政策独立性及其法律制度研究[J]. 上海财经大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2006, 8(5): 41-47
作者姓名:伏军
作者单位:对外经济贸易大学,法学院,北京,100029
摘    要:货币政策职能是中央银行的核心职能,中央银行货币政策目标的实现需要以中央银行独立的法律地位为前提。世界各国中央银行的独立性正呈现出不断强化的趋势。我国《人民银行法》的现行法律制度框架下,中国人民银行在货币政策的制订、实施、人事任免等方面受到中央政府的制约与控制,具有较低的独立性。为满足经济可持续发展及新宏观经济形势的需要,应进一步提高人民银行的独立性并在法律制度层面上予以完善。

关 键 词:中央银行  货币政策  独立性
文章编号:1009-0150(2006)05-0041-07
收稿时间:2006-06-05
修稿时间:2006-06-05

Central Bank: Monetary Policy, Independence and Legal System
FU Jun. Central Bank: Monetary Policy, Independence and Legal System[J]. Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, 2006, 8(5): 41-47
Authors:FU Jun
Abstract:Monetary policy function is the core function of the central bank,which brings out effect only based upon the independent status of the central bank.Most of countries are strengthening their central bank's independency in recent years.The People's bank of China is still under a strong restriction and control from the central government in terms of monetary policy making and execution,personnel appointment,etc.,and therefore enjoys a low level of independency.Steps shall be taken to improve the current situation for the need of the sustainable development of economy and new economic situation.
Keywords:central bank  monetary policy  independency
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