Industrial Sickness, Primary and Secondary: The Effects of Exit Constraints on Industrial Performance |
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Authors: | Pursell Garry |
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Institution: | The author is an economist in the Country Economics Department of the World Bank. He is grateful for useful comments from Jim Hanson, Lloyd McKay, Peter Wogart, Richard Snape, and three anonymous referees. For related work on this topic, see Pursell (1989). |
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Abstract: | In an attempt to protect workers from unemployment, governmentsin some countries subsidize firms which would otherwise fail.This article examines the effects of such subsidies on output,prices, and welfare. It also briefly reviews the effects forvarying price elasticities of supply and demand, for nontradedand fully traded goods, and for firms in which wages exceedtheir free market level. If the firm produces a nontraded good,the "sickness" of one firm that is subsidized to maintain productioncan spread to other firms that would be viable in the absenceof the subsidies. The analysis shows that the exit constraintshave the most detrimental effect when the elasticity of demandis low and supply elasticity is high, and when the governmentweighs the welfare of the firm's workers and consumers lessthan that of the general taxpayers and the firm owners. Whenlabor costs are higher than their free market levels and outputis thus less than the optimal levels, the subsidies could havean effect similar to that of an optimal production subsidy.In practice, however, this possibility is likely to be outweighedby associated rent-seeking costs and other distortions. |
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