The envelope theorem for locally differentiable Nash equilibria of finite horizon differential games |
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Authors: | Michael R Caputo |
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Institution: | aDepartment of Economics, University of Central Florida, PO Box 161400, Orlando, FL 32816-1400, USA |
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Abstract: | Envelope theorems are established for a ubiquitous class of finite horizon differential games. The theorems cover open-loop and feedback information patterns in which the corresponding Nash equilibria are locally differentiable with respect to the parameters of the game. Their relationship with extant envelope results is discussed and an application of them to a generalized capital accumulation game is provided. An important implication of the theorems is that, in general, the archetypal economic interpretation of the costate vector, namely, as the shadow value of the state vector along the Nash equilibrium, is valid for feedback Nash equilibria, but not for open-loop Nash equilibria. |
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Keywords: | Envelope theorem Differential games Nash equilibria |
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