A controlled field experiment on corruption |
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Authors: | Olivier Armantier Amadou Boly |
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Institution: | aFederal Reserve Bank of New York, CIRANO, and CIREQ, United States;bUnited Nations Industrial Development Organization, Vienna International Center, P.O. Box 300, A-1400 Vienna, Austria |
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Abstract: | This paper reports on a controlled field experiment on corruption designed to address two important issues: the experimenter's scrutiny and the unobservability of corruption. In the experiment, a grader is offered a bribe along with a demand for a better grade. We find that graders respond more favorably to bigger bribes, while the effect of higher wages is ambiguous: it lowers the bribe's acceptance, but it fosters reciprocation. Monitoring and punishment can deter corruption, but we cannot reject that it may also crowd-out intrinsic motivations for honesty when intensified. Finally, our results suggest several micro-determinants of corruption including age, ability, religiosity, but not gender. |
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Keywords: | Corruption Experimental economics Field experiments |
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