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Ownership structure and corporate governance in Chinese stock companies
Institution:1. School of Economics and Management, Guangxi Normal University, Guilin, China;2. School of Accounting, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, China;3. School of Economics and Finance, Massey University (Albany Campus), New Zealand;1. Sunmoon University, Asan 31460, Republic of Korea;2. Ajou University, Suwon 16499, Republic of Korea;3. Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU), Seoul 13063, Republic of Korea;1. Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, USA;2. Department of Applied Economics, School of Management, Fudan University, Shanghai, China;3. The Growth Lab, Center for International Development, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA;4. Core China Research Center, School of Economics and Business, University of Navarra, Spain;5. Department of Economic History, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, UK
Abstract:This study investigates whether ownership structure significantly affects the performance of publicly listed companies in China within the framework of corporate governance. A typical listed stock company in China has a mixed ownership structure with three predominant groups of shareholders—the state, legal persons (institutions), and individuals—each holding approximately 30% of the stock. Ownership is heavily concentrated. The five largest shareholders accounted for 58% of the outstanding shares in 1995, compared with 57.8% in the Czech Republic, 79% in Germany, and 33% in Japan. Empirical analysis shows that the mix and concentration of stock ownership do indeed significantly affect a company's performance. First, there is a positive and significant correlation between ownership concentration and profitability. Second, the firm's profitability is positively correlated with the fraction of legal person shares, but it is either negatively correlated or uncorrelated with the fractions of state shares and tradable A-shares held mostly by individuals. Third, labor productivity tends to decline as the proportion of state shares increases. These results suggest the importance of large institutional shareholders in corporate governance, the inefficiency of state ownership, and potential problems in an overly dispersed ownership structure.
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