On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly |
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Authors: | Francesco De Sinopoli Giovanna Iannantuoni |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University Carlos III de Madrid, Calle Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe Madrid, SPAIN |
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Abstract: | Summary. We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.JEL Classification Numbers:
C72, D72.We would like to thank Luisa Bassotto, Marco Celentani, Mamoru Kaneko, and participants at the 6
International Conference on Current Trends in Economics for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee of this journal for precious advices that have substantially improved this paper. This paper was partially written while Francesco was visiting Tor Vergata University, which he thanks for hospitality and financial support. The usual disclaimer applies. |
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Keywords: | Plurality rule Regular equilibria Stable sets |
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