An experimental study of bidding in contests of incomplete information |
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Authors: | Philip Brookins Dmitry Ryvkin |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, 32306-2180, USA
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Abstract: | In many contest situations, such as R&D competition and rent seeking, participants’ costs are private information. We report the results of an experimental study of bidding in contests under different information and symmetry conditions about players’ costs of effort. The theory predicts qualitatively different comparative statics between bids under complete and incomplete information in contests of two and more than two players. We use a 2×3 experimental design, (n=2, n=4)×(symmetric complete information, asymmetric complete information, incomplete information), to test the theoretical predictions. We find the comparative statics of bids across the information and symmetry conditions, and the qualitative differences in comparative statics across group sizes, in partial agreement with the theory. |
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