Limiting Dictatorial rules |
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Institution: | 1. Toulouse School of Economics, France;2. CEMOI, Université de La Réunion, France;1. Universita’ degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l’Economia e l’Impresa, Via delle Pandette 9, I-50127 Firenze, Italy;2. Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) and Barcelona GSE, Spain;3. Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI, GREMAQ), France;4. Department of Economics, Sungkyunkwan University, South Korea |
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Abstract: | We consider the preference aggregation problem in infinite societies. In our model, there are arbitrarily many agents and alternatives, and admissible coalitions may be restricted to lie in an algebra. In this framework (which includes the standard one), we characterize, in terms of Strict Neutrality, the Ultrafilter Property of preference aggregation rules. Based on this property, we define the concept of Limiting Dictatorial rules, which are characterized by the existence of arbitrarily small decisive coalitions. We show that, in infinite societies which can be well approximated by finite ones, any Arrovian rule is limiting. |
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