Monotonic matching in search equilibrium |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Paris School of Economics and Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, France;2. Paris School of Economics and University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France;1. University of Rochester, United States;2. La Trobe University, Australia;3. University of Brasilia, Brazil;4. University of Melbourne, Australia;1. Hoover Institution and Department of Economics, Stanford University, United States;2. National Bureau of Economic Research, United States |
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| Abstract: | It is well-known from Becker’s [Becker, G., 1973. A theory of marriage, Part I. Journal of Political Economy 81, 813–846] analysis of the neoclassical marriage market that matching is positive assortative if agent-types are complements in household production. Shimer and Smith [Shimer, R., Smith, L., 2000. Assortative matching and search. Econometrica 68, 343–369] have shown that this result does not generally extend to markets with search frictions, and they provide additional conditions on the production function that guarantee assortative matching in these settings. Here, the relationship between the Shimer–Smith restrictions and equilibrium matching pattern is considered, and alternative proofs of their results on assortative matching are provided. |
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