An empirical examination of the costs and benefits of executive stock options: Evidence from Japan |
| |
Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA;2. Department of Economics, National Tsing Hua University, Hsinchu 30013, Taiwan;1. Department of Business Administration, College of Management, National Formosa University, No. 64, Wunhua Road, Huwei Township, Yunlin County 632, Taiwan;2. Department of Finance, National Taipei University of Business, No. 321, Sec. 1, Jinan Road, Taipei, Taiwan |
| |
Abstract: | In May 1997, the Japanese Commercial Code was amended to allow firms to begin granting stock options as compensation to top management and employees. Nearly 350 firms adopted option-based compensation plans between 1997 and 2001. These options typically have five-year lives and are out-of-the-money by about 5% at the grant date. Firms exhibit abnormal stock returns of about 2% around the announcements of plan adoptions. We find improvements in operating performance and observe that dividend policy and volatility remain unchanged post-adoption. Our evidence suggests that well-designed incentive compensation plans are consistent with the creation of shareholder value. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|