Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types |
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| Institution: | 1. Université de Paris-Dauphine, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, F-75775 Paris Cedex 16, France;2. THEMA (CNRS, UMR 7536), Université de Cergy-Pontoise, 33 Boulevard du Port, F-95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, France;1. Université Paris 1, 106-112, Bd de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris, France;2. Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France;3. CNRS, GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, Ecully, F-69130, France;4. University Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France;5. Paris School of Economics, Université Paris 1, 106-112, Bd de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris, France;1. Korea University, Republic of Korea;2. University of Exeter, United Kingdom;1. Departamento de Análisis Económico and ERI-CES, University of Valencia, Facultad de Economía, Campus dels Tarongers, 46022 Valencia, Spain;2. D. Mètodes Quantitatius i Teoria Econòmica and Instituto Desarrollo Social y Paz (IUDESP), Universitat d’Alacant, Spain;1. NYU-Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates;2. University of Bern, Switzerland;3. Sciences Po, France;4. Yale-NUS College, Singapore |
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| Abstract: | This paper studies the set of equilibria that can be achieved by adding general communication systems to Bayesian games in which some information can be certified or, equivalently, in which players’ types are partially verifiable. Certifiability of information is formalized by a set of available reports for each player that varies with the true state of the world. Given these state-dependent sets of reports, we characterize canonical equilibria for which generalized versions of the revelation principle are valid. Communication equilibria and associated canonical representations are obtained as special cases when no information can be certified. |
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