| 非对称冲击下的货币政策协调：一个斯塔克尔伯格模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 索彦峰,徐筱雯.非对称冲击下的货币政策协调：一个斯塔克尔伯格模型[J].南京财经大学学报,2007(1):61-64. |
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| 作者姓名： | 索彦峰 徐筱雯 |
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| 作者单位： | [1]南京大学商学院,江苏南京210093 [2]南京财经大学金融学院,江苏南京210003 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文在非对称性冲击的假定下，研究了货币政策协调的斯塔克尔伯格博弈。对模型的斯塔克尔伯格均衡解的分析表明，非对称冲击对货币政策协调的政策效果有着不确定影响。在货币政策协调领域，由于冲击性质的改变，斯塔克尔伯格博弈中领导者的“先发优势”和“先动策略”并不能保证其从货币政策协调中获取确定的政策收益。
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| 关 键 词： | 非对称冲击 货币政策协调 斯塔克尔伯格模型 溢出效应 |
| 文章编号： | 1672-6049（2007）01-0061-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-11-26 |
Monetary Policy Coordination Under Asymmetric Shocks:A Stackelberg Model |
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| SUO Yanfeng, XU Xiaowen.Monetary Policy Coordination Under Asymmetric Shocks:A Stackelberg Model[J].Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics,2007(1):61-64. |
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| Authors: | SUO Yanfeng XU Xiaowen |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Business, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China; 2. School of Finance, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, Nanjing 210003, China |
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| Abstract: | In this paper, we analyzed the monetary policy coordination by a Stackelberg model under the hypothesis of asymmetric shocks. The analysis of the Stackelberg equilibrium solutions to the model shows that the asymmetric shocks have uncertain effect on the policy result of monetary policy coordination. In the area of monetary policy coordination, the preemptive superiority and strategy of the leader in the Stackelberg game cannot ensure him get certain policy gains from the monetary policy coordination. |
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| Keywords: | Asymmetric Shocks Monetary Policy Coordination Stackelberg Model spillover effects |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 等数据库收录！ |
