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股权制度安排、信息不对称与企业非效率投资行为
引用本文:欧阳凌,欧阳令南,周红霞. 股权制度安排、信息不对称与企业非效率投资行为[J]. 当代经济科学, 2005, 27(4): 72-78
作者姓名:欧阳凌  欧阳令南  周红霞
作者单位:1. 上海交通大学,安泰管理学院,上海,200052
2. 上海交通大学,科技处,上海,200030
摘    要:本文针对股权分置和股权全流通的制度安排,在不同信息状态下研究了企业的投资行为.研究表明,信息对称时,股权全流通制度下企业投资行为达到最优,股权分置制度下国有资产的高折算溢价使得企业存在投资过度行为;信息不对称时,股权分置制度下低质量企业表现出更多投资过度行为,高质量企业表现出更多投资不足行为.证券监管部门近期应该促使股权全流通,远期应该重视规范企业信息披露,从而提高企业投资决策的效率.

关 键 词:投资不足  投资过度  信息不对称  国有股折算溢价
文章编号:1002-2848-2005(04)-0072-07
修稿时间:2005-04-23

Equity System, Asymmetric Information and Inefficient Investment Behavior
OUYANG Ling,OUYANG Ling-nan,ZHOU Hong-xia. Equity System, Asymmetric Information and Inefficient Investment Behavior[J]. Modern Economic Science, 2005, 27(4): 72-78
Authors:OUYANG Ling  OUYANG Ling-nan  ZHOU Hong-xia
Abstract:This paper studies the investment behavior under different information conditions, with ditlerent institutional arrangements of split stock rights and all-equity circulation. We find that the symmetric information leads optimum investment under all-equity circulation and over-investment under split stock rights due to high discounted premium of state-owned assets, and that asymmetric information leads to over-investment for low quality firms and under-investment for high quality firms. With aim of improving investment efficiency, governmental securities supervision agencies should take actions to promote all-equity circulation in the near future and regulate information disposure in the long run.
Keywords:Under-investment  Over-investment  Asymmetric information  State-owned stock premium
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