| 税收征纳博弈及其行为解析 |
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| 引用本文： | 屈锡华,杨继瑞,李晓涛. 税收征纳博弈及其行为解析[J]. 经济学家, 2003, 0(3): 82-90 |
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| 作者姓名： | 屈锡华 杨继瑞 李晓涛 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 四川大学公共管理学院,四川,成都,610064
2. 四川大学经济学院,四川,成都,610064 |
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| 摘 要： | 税收漏洞是促使税制完备与系统一致性的推动力。在不完备的税收制度与非一致性的税收环境中，纳税人与税收征管主体双方都必然存在对策筹划与行为抉择的战略空间。正是在这一对策均衡与非均衡的不断演绎过程中，税制才得以不断完善，从而达到系统一致性的理想境界。基于上述认识，本文着重在宏观层面上对税收漏洞问题进行行为解释与策略均衡分析，旨在从原理上构建一个税收征纳的博弈格局和对策框架。
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| 关 键 词： | 税收征纳 博弈分析 行为假设 纳税人行为分析 税漏空间 行为参数设置 矛盾冲突 博弈均衡 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-5656(2003)03-0082-09 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003-02-13 |
The Gaming Process and Behavioral Explanation of Tax Collection and Paying |
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| QU Xi-hua YANG Ji-rui LI Xiao-tao. The Gaming Process and Behavioral Explanation of Tax Collection and Paying[J]. Economist, 2003, 0(3): 82-90 |
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| Authors: | QU Xi-hua YANG Ji-rui LI Xiao-tao |
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| Affiliation: | QU Xi-hua1 YANG Ji-rui2 LI Xiao-tao2 |
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| Abstract: | The loophole of taxation has been an impetus for completeness of tax system and systematic consistency. Under the circumstances of incomplete tax system and tax environmental inconsistency, is there inevitably a strategic space for both taxpayers and tax collectors to take gaming planning and behavioral selection. It is in the process of constant deduction of gaming equilibrium or non-equilibrium, that tax system gradually comes to perfection and reaches ideal condition of systematic consistency. Based upon the above cognitions, the article emphatically makes behavioral explanations for and equilibrium analyses of the loophole of taxation in macroscopic view, intending to construct gaming profile and countermeasure framework on tax collection and paying. |
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| Keywords: | tax collection and paying game playing tax evasion loophole of taxation tactic equilibrium |
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