R&D Policy Involving Consumer-Friendly Strategy: Cooperative and Non-Cooperative R&D

In a highly globalized economy, foreign exporting firms have initiatives to be consumer friendly for many reasons. The aim of the present paper is to endogenize consumer-friendly actions by the exporting firms, and explore how government’s industrial policy and firm’s R&D investment are affected by the strategy of foreign exporting firms under cooperative and non-cooperative R&D commitments in an international rivalry market. It finds that consumer-friendly action is a dominant strategy equilibrium, and no matter whether under cooperative or non-cooperative R&D, a consumer-friendly firm tends to invest less than does the purely profit-maximizing firm on R&D under symmetrical decisions. In the case of firms cooperating in R&D and involving consumer-friendliness in action, their governments need not intervene. On the other hand, governments always subsidize non-cooperative R&D activities, or cooperative but unfriendly firms. Furthermore, the consumer-friendly action will result in more (less) R&D subsidies by the exporting government when both firms non-cooperate (cooperate) in R&D. Finally, it is robust to indicate that the government of an importing country prefers friendly foreign firms in any circumstances. Above all, the equilibrium outcomes explain the crucial role of consumer-friendly strategy for industrial policies and R&D activities.