Exploring issues of market inefficiency by the role of forecasting accuracy in survivability

Whether markets are efficient or not has been broadly discussed in the empirical literature since the efficient markets hypothesis was proposed by Fama and others in the 1960s. Unfortunately, they did not come to a consistent conclusion. Besides, while these studies show whether a specific market is efficient or not, little has been done to explore the issues regarding the degree of market inefficiency. This paper attempts to resolve the puzzle of the inconsistent conclusions in the empirical literature by adopting a bottom-up approach which takes market participants’ interactions and coordination into consideration. By simulating an agent-based artificial stock market, this paper concludes with three main findings. First, agents’ survivability is mainly decided by risk preference, and not forecasting accuracy. Survivors may have diverse forecasting accuracy. Second, because market prices are not decided by agents based on accurate predictions, markets can not be efficient. What may exist is only the difference of the degree of inefficiency between markets. Third, the more relevant to survivability the forecasting accuracy in a market is, the less inefficient the market will be. Therefore, this paper suggests that it may be better to view the divergent empirical results regarding market efficiency as a fact that markets are inefficient to a variety of degrees.