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A Theoretical Inefficiency in the International Marketing of Tradable Global Warming Emission Permits
Authors:Robert?E.?Kohn  author-information"  >  author-information__contact u-icon-before"  >  mailto:Robert.Kohn.@post.harvard.edu"   title="  Robert.Kohn.@post.harvard.edu"   itemprop="  email"   data-track="  click"   data-track-action="  Email author"   data-track-label="  "  >Email author
Affiliation:(1) Department of Economics, Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, Edwardsville, IL 62026, USA;(2) Present address: 52 Broadview Drive, Clayton, MO, 63105-3029
Abstract:When the disutility of global pollution is measured in units of a numeraire good that is polluting in consumption, the marginal rates of substitution in consumption are generally weighted differently in each countryrsquos calculation of marginal damages. In that case, it is inefficient to control global warming by tradable emission permits, which in theory trade at a unique international equilibrium price. This conclusion is derived from a model of Shibata (1996) in which consumption is pervasively polluting in global warming gases. Shibata dubiously based the inefficiency he discovered on the reciprocal external damages of global warming emissions rather than on the nullibicity he posed for a non-polluting numeraire good.JEL Classification Numbers: F02, Q4, Q25
Keywords:non-uniform Pigouvian taxes  global pollutant  global warming  emission permits
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